Research project | Roni Laakso
Project Overview
Risk appetite is a central concept in European banking regulation and corporate governance. Banks are expected to establish risk appetite frameworks, define acceptable levels of risk-taking and ensure that their governance arrangements, strategic decisions and remuneration policies are aligned with their risk appetite.
However, the concept raises fundamental legal and conceptual questions. Although risk appetite is used in binding EU banking legislation, its definition and practical implementation rely extensively on international standards and supervisory guidance. Moreover, the relationship between an institution’s formally documented risk appetite and its actual risk-taking behaviour is not necessarily straightforward.
This research examines the different definitions and conceptual understandings of risk appetite in European banking regulation, their legal foundations and their implications for bank governance, supervisory assessment and individual accountability.
Research Focus
The project investigates the different definitions and conceptual understandings of risk appetite in European banking regulation and their implications for the interpretation and application of regulatory requirements.
The research addresses several interconnected questions:
- How is risk appetite defined and understood across binding EU banking legislation, international regulatory standards, supervisory guidance and relevant academic literature?
- What are the differences between risk appetite understood as formally documented risk limits, actual risk-taking preferences and a normative standard for acceptable risk-taking?
- How do different definitions of risk appetite influence the understanding of excessive risk-taking, particularly where the interests of individual banks and the wider financial system diverge?
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What implications does this conceptual divergence have for banking supervision and the responsibilities of bank management bodies?
Research Approach
The research adopts an institutional law and economics perspective, drawing on scholarship in financial economics, corporate governance, law and enterprise risk management.
It examines the treatment of risk appetite in the EU Capital Requirements Directive, the regulatory principles of international standard-setting bodies and the guidelines and supervisory approaches of the European Banking Authority and European Central Bank.
By comparing different theoretical understandings of risk appetite and excessive risk-taking, the paper considers how the selection of a particular definition influences the practical scope of regulatory obligations and supervisory assessments.
Research Contribution
The research seeks to clarify the different definitions and conceptual understandings of risk appetite and their implications for the interpretation and application of European banking regulation.
It examines how risk appetite can be understood as a formally documented framework, a reflection of actual risk-taking preferences or a normative standard for acceptable risk-taking, and why these distinctions matter for regulatory obligations and supervisory assessments.
The paper also considers how different benchmarks for excessive risk-taking may lead to different assessments of the same conduct, particularly where the interests of individual banks diverge from those of the wider financial system.
The broader objective is to contribute to the conceptual foundations of bank governance regulation and to the development of supervisory approaches that account for the different functions served by the concept of risk appetite.
Research Output
Working paper (in preparation)
Risk Appetite as a Legal Obligation: Definitional Divergence and the Threshold of Excess in EU Banking Regulation
Research areas: Bank risk appetite, EU banking regulation, excessive risk-taking, bank corporate governance, systemic risk, risk appetite frameworks, banking supervision.
Last updated: 20 October 2026