Doctoral dissertation | Roni Laakso | 2023
Overview
The governance of systemically important banks plays a central role in financial stability. Excessive risk-taking by these institutions can create consequences extending far beyond their shareholders and creditors, potentially affecting the wider financial system and economy.
Banking regulation has traditionally addressed systemic risk through measures such as capital requirements, liquidity regulation and supervisory oversight. However, these approaches do not necessarily address the underlying incentives that influence banks’ willingness to assume risk.
This doctoral dissertation examines whether the regulation of board governance could provide alternative means for reducing excessive risk appetite and systemic risk.
The central argument is that strengthening the influence of creditors in board governance could help align risk-taking decisions more closely with the interests of the wider set of risk-averse stakeholders affected by bank failures.
Research Questions
The dissertation addresses the following principal research question:
Could board governance in systemic banks be structured and regulated in a way that would reduce excessive risk appetite and lower the probability of systemic instability?
The analysis explores several related issues, including:
- How do the structural characteristics of systemically important banks influence the risk-taking incentives of shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders?
- To what extent can existing approaches to banking regulation address excessive risk appetite?
- How could the composition, responsibilities and incentives of bank boards be modified to encourage more prudent risk-taking?
- Could stronger creditor participation in bank governance contribute to financial stability?
Research Approach
The dissertation adopts an interdisciplinary law and economics approach, drawing particularly on agency theory to examine conflicts of interest and risk-taking incentives in systemically important banks. The research is primarily theoretical and develops a governance model through legal and economic analysis of alternative regulatory arrangements for managing systemic risk.
Main Findings and Research Contribution
The dissertation concludes that enhancing creditor influence in board governance offers a potentially valuable, but relatively underexplored, approach to reducing excessive risk-taking and managing systemic risk.
To illustrate this approach, the research develops the ECE Governance Model, which proposes shifting some influence over the governance of systemic banks from shareholders towards creditors through four mechanisms:
- Dual fiduciary duties: Introducing a duty of loyalty towards both shareholders and bondholders.
- Director liability: Strengthening accountability for breaches of the dual duty.
- Creditor representation: Providing qualifying bondholders with board seats or influence over the nomination process for board members.
- Bond-based remuneration: Aligning directors’ financial incentives more closely with those of creditors.
The dissertation argues that greater creditor influence could serve as an indirect means of representing the interests of other risk-averse stakeholders, including those who may bear the wider economic costs of bank failures.
The proposed model offers a theoretical alternative to relying exclusively on increasingly detailed prudential regulation to address excessive risk-taking and systemic risk.
Publication Details
Laakso, Roni (2023) Corporate Governance in Systemic Banks: Reducing Risk Appetite and Systemic Risk through the Regulation of Board Governance. Doctoral dissertation (monograph). University of Helsinki, Faculty of Law. Unigrafia.
ISBN (print): 978-951-51-9964-5
ISBN (electronic): 978-951-51-9965-2
Read the full dissertation – University of Helsinki
Related Research
Related working papers derived from the dissertation include:
- An Institutional Law and Economics Framework for the Analysis of Bank Governance: Methodology and Conceptual Definitions
- What Makes Systemic Banks Different: Structural Characteristics and their Implications for Stakeholder Risk Preferences and Excessive Risk Appetite
- Regulating Excessive Risk-taking in Systemic Banks: The Limits of the Existing Alternatives and the Case for Increased Creditor Influence in Board Governance
Research areas: Bank corporate governance, board governance, systemic risk, risk appetite, excessive risk-taking, stakeholder governance, directors’ duties, board remuneration, banking regulation, law and economics.
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